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Abstract: Cryptographic devices such as Hardware Security Modules are only as secure
as their application programme interfaces (APIs) that offer cryptographic functionality to
the outside world. Design flaws and implementation errors in security APIs have been
shown to cause vulnerabilities that may leak secrets such as keys and PINs. Ideally, we
would like to design such interfaces in such a way that we can formally prove security prop-
erties, even in the presence of some corrupted keys. In this work, we take such a design
for a provably secure interface for symmetric key management, due to Cortier and Steel,
and extend it to asymmetric cryptography, giving new security definitions and associated
proofs. Asymmetric cryptography forces us to consider confidentiality and integrity prop-
erties separately and provide support for classical operations of public key infrastructure
(e.g. certification of public keys). As far as we are aware this is the first such provably
secure interface to support asymmetric key operations for key management: Cachin and
Chandran’s secure token interface supports asymmetric key operations only for encrypting
and signing data, not for managing keys.
Key-words: crytography, key management, security APIs
Une généralisation de l’API Cortier-Steel pour la cryptographie
asymétrique
Résumé : Les systèmes cryptographiques tels que les modules matériels de sécurité ne peuvent
apporter de garanties de sécurité que dans la mesure où leur interface de programmation (API), qui
offre les services de cryptographie à l’extérieur de module, atteint un certain niveau de sécurité. Il a
été constaté que des défauts de conception ou des erreurs d’implémentation dans les APIs de sécurité
sont à l’origine de vulnérabilités pouvant entraîner la fuite de secrets comme des clefs ou des PINs.
Idéalement, nous voudrions concevoir de telles interfaces de manière à pouvoir prouver formellement
des propriétés de sécurité, même si certaines clefs sont corrompues. Dans cet article, nous partons
d’une telle API, due à Cortier et Steel, conçue de manière à disposer d’une preuve de sécurité pour
la gestion de clefs symétriques, et nous l’adaptons à la cryptographie asymétrique en donnant une
nouvelle définition de sécurité avec les preuves associées. Afin de prendre en compte la cryptographie
asymétrique, nous sommes amenés à gérer de manière différentiée les propriétés de confidentialité et
d’intégrité et à ajouter les fonctionnalités classiques d’une infrastructure de gestion de clefs publiques
(i.e. la certification des clefs publiques). À notre connaissance, il s’agit de la première preuve d’interface
prouvée permettant l’usage de primitives asymétriques pour la gestion de clefs : l’interface de Cachin
et Chandran prévoit l’usage de primitives asymétriques uniquement pour le chiffrement et la signature
de données, et non pas pour la gestion des clefs.
Mots-clés : cryptographie, gestion des clés, sécurité des APIs
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1 Introduction
In a context of constant security threats combined with increasing heterogeneity of platforms and
applications, developers are turning more and more to solutions based on secure hardware, whether
it be a smartcard, Trusted Platform Module (TPM), hardware-secured virtual execution environment
(e.g. TrustZone) or Hardware Security Module (HSM). In a typical architecture, the secure hardware
contains cryptographic keys and the ability to perform some basic crypto operations which can be
leveraged to ensure security for the whole system. However, designing the application programme
interface (API) of such a device is difficult: it must allow the user to manage the keys on the device
and access the crypto without allowing an attacker, who may in the worst case be able to make
arbitrary calls to the API, to be able to obtain secrets. Many attacks have been found on the APIs
of contemporary devices [2, 3, 5]. One promising approach to solving this problem is to design APIs
such that one can formally prove security properties in the presence of a suitably powerful intruder.
Such an approach has been applied both in the standard cryptographic model [4] and the symbolic or
Dolev-Yao model [7].
However, neither of these designs present a scheme for managing keys using asymmetric cryptog-
raphy, which is widely used in practice for the task since it provides a convenient way to bootstrap
security without any pre-shared secrets. The contribution of this paper is to present the design for such
an API with security proofs in the symbolic model. For the symmetric key part of the API, we adapt
slightly the API designed by Cortier and Steel [7]. For the asymmetric key part, we have to solve a
problem that doesn’t arise in the symmetric key case: so-called “Trojan key” attacks [6]. Since anyone
can encrypt under a public key, we have to add an explicit mechanism for assuring the integrity of keys
to be imported onto a device. We add signature keys for signing encryption under public keys and also
separate certification keys, the latter used to manage the public key infrastructure (PKI) of keys and
certificates. We show how to adapt the security labels given to keys by Cortier and Steel to this new
scenario, with separate labels for confidentiality of the private key and integrity of the corresponding
public key. This allows us to account for corruption in our proof. As far as we are aware, this is the
first such design to be proposed with security proofs.
This report is organized as follows. We start with an introduction of our symbolic model and
explain the features of our API design in Section 2. We describe the API rules formally in Section 3,
and then give the security properties and sketch their proof in Section 4. Then, the complete details
of the proof can be found in Section 5. We describe some experiments implementing protocols with
the API in Section 6 and draw conclusions in Section 7.
Related Work Cortier and Steel (CS) [7] proposed an API that supports only symmetric key cryp-
tography, but can nonetheless be used to implement any secure symmetric key exchange protocol from
the Clark-Jacob corpus. The main principle is that keys are arranged in a hierarchy of levels. Each key
is associated to its level and the set of agents who are allowed to use it. This association is made when
storing the key on the device, by including it as metadata stored with the key, and when encrypting
the key for transfer, by tagging the encrypted key with exactly this information. The API rules are
designed such that keys may only be encrypted by other keys which are higher in the hierarchy, i.e.
they are at least one level higher and assigned to a set of agents that is equal to or smaller than the
payload key. We generalise this notion slightly in our API. The CS API includes a notion of freshness
for imported keys enforced by nonces. It has also recently been extended to accommodate key revoca-
tion [8]. Although we do not include these mechanisms in our API, we do not foresee any obstacle to
these generalizations if needed.
Cachin and Chandran proposed an API with a quite different design [4]. They rely on the fact that
all keys are stored on a central key server. Instead of assigning security attributes such as levels and
agent identifiers to keys at creation time, they allow the key’s role to evolve over time by logging all
operations, and then disallowing operations that would be insecure by observing the log. They allow
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asymmetric keys to be managed by symmetric key cryptography, but do not allow asymmetric keys to
be used for key management operations like export and import.
Other work has investigated the foundations of models for secure key management APIs: Kremer,
Steel and Warinschi give a model that can be interpreted in the symbolic and computational cryptog-
raphy worlds [11]. They show that the possibility of key corruption requires strong assumptions to
be made on the key wrapping primitives in the computational model. Recent work by Künnemann,
Kremer and Steel investigates composable notions of security for key management [10]. This is an
appealing idea because it allows (almost) arbitrary secure cryptographic primitives to be used with the
keys under management without having to repeat the security proofs, but currently only management
with symmetric keys is supported.
2 Design of the API
We present the design of our API in an abstract ‘Dolev-Yao’ style symbolic model. We first describe
the roles assigned to keys in our API. We then give the syntax and informal semantics for the message
algebra and introduce our notion of key handles which extends previous designs.
2.1 Key Types
In order to limit the number of key roles in the API we consider that the asymmetric keys are double
keys, with one part for encryption/decryption, and one for signature/verification. This means that
the same key can be used as an input of both an encryption and a signature scheme. Thus, we have
encryption/verification public keys and decryption/signature private keys. It is clear that in practise a
double key can simply be obtained by the concatenation of a signature and encryption key and that a
simple key can be simulated by a double key. Thus, we do not lose generality with this simplification.
Moreover, it makes sense from a security point of view since the encrypt and sign operation is the
minimal basic operation which ensures the confidentiality of message and an authentication of the
issuer, which is mandatory for the set up of our security policy. Signature keys are used to sign
encryptions of other keys or messages. Asymmetric public keys are certified by certification keys (with
a signature algorithm).
The list of key roles that we are going to manipulate is:
• symmetric encryption/decryption keys;
• encryption/verification of signature double public keys;
• decryption/signature double private keys;
• verification of certificates public keys;
• certification private keys.
It is possible that the algorithm used to sign the certificates is the same as the one used to sign the
encrypted messages. Nonetheless, it is important to distinguish the key roles to prevent a signature
algorithm from being used as a certification oracle by an adversary. The different key roles and their
associated types are summarised in the table 1. T denotes the set of key types.
2.2 Security Levels
The set of key security levels I is a finite set together with an partial strict order relation denoted <.
We suppose that there is a minimal element in I denoted by 0. By definition, for all x ∈ I \ 0, we have
0 < x. The 0 element represents the security level of public information. We are given a partition of
I in two subsets:
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Key Role Type
Priv decryption/signature private key privDecSign
Pub encryption/verification of signature public key pubEncVerif
Sym symmetric encryption key symEncDec
pub certificate verification key pubCertVerif
priv certificate signature key privCertSign
Figure 1: Table of the set of key roles and types (T )
• the levels I1 ⊂ I which correspond to the keys which can only deal with regular messages;
• the levels I2 ⊂ I which correspond to the keys which can be used to transport keys of level I1.
We set I>0 = I1 ∪ I2 = I − {0}.
2.3 Message Algebra
Messages are represented by a term algebra. We suppose given a set of agents Agent, a set of nonces
Nonce and a set of keys Key. We are also given a set of variables Var in which we distinguish a set of
key variables VarKey and a set of nonce variables VarNonce. All these sets are countably infinite. The
term algebra is given by:
Keyv ::= Key | VarKey | inv(Keyv)
Noncev ::= Nonce | VarNonce
Msg ::= Agent | Keyv | Noncev | I | T | {|Msg|}Keyv | {Msg}Keyv
| Σ(Msg,Keyv) | nhdl(Msg)| < Msg,Msg >
Handle ::= hαAgent(Noncev,Noncev,Msg, T , I,S ,S )
| hAgent(Noncev,Msg)
where S is the set of subsets of Agent.
The set Keyv represents the set of keys and variable of keys. A term of the form inv(k) with
k ∈ Key represents the private key associated to the public key k. The set Noncev is the set of
nonces and variable of nonces. The terms of type Msg are made of elements of Agent, Keyv, Noncev
together with constructors representing encryption, signature together with sets needed to represent
the attributes of the handles. More precisely,
• the term {|m|}k represents the symmetric encryption of the message m with the key k;
• the term {m}k represents the asymmetric encryption of the message m with the double key k;
• the term Σ(m, k) represents the signature of the message m with the double key k;
• the term nhdl() allows one to encapsulate a regular message which does not correspond to the
transportation of a handle (see below);
• the term < m1,m2 > represents the pair of the two messages m1,m2 ∈ Msg.
For n > 0, < m1, < m2, < . . . ,mn >>> is shortened as m1, . . . ,mn.
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2.4 Handles
The purpose of a key management API is to give access to cryptographic functionalities without giving
direct access to sensitive keys stored on the device. Instead, an agent can manipulate the data by
calling the API commands and referring to the keys by their handles. A key handle can be thought of
as a name for a key, or as a pointer to that key. Knowing the value of a key handle does not give any
information about the cryptographic value of the key. We have two types of handles:
• key handles used to protect integrity and confidentiality of the data on the device. They are
typically used for keys and secret nonces.
• integrity handles used to protect the integrity of data on the device. They are typically used for
certificates that have been verified.
Key handles are terms of the form hαa (N1, N2,m, T, i, S1, S2), with:
• the agent a ∈ Agent who owns the handle;
• the identifier N1 ∈ Nonce (unique in the whole system) of the handle;
• if m is a double private key, then N2 is the identifier of the associated certificate of the double
public key, else N2 = Null;
• the message m ∈ Msg (usually m is a key or a nonce) associated to the handle;
• the type T ∈ T of the message (see table 1 for a list of possible types);
• the triple (i, S1, S2) ∈ I ×S ×S is the security level of the handle (the security policy of the
API is based on this structure);
• the label α ∈ {r, g} allows to distinguish the keys which have been generated by a (α = g) from
the keys which have been received and imported (α = r).
Integrity handles are terms of the form ha(N1,m) with an identifier N1 and a message m ∈ Msg. They
are meant to model the preservation of the integrity of data by a signature : given as input a valid
signature of a message m, the API produces an integrity handle containing the message m. Contrarily
to the common usage in cryptography where a public key certificate corresponds to signed public
information, we distinguish here two elements, the pre-certificate and the certificate which is a signed
pre-certificate. Indeed, the outcome of the certificate verification operation is a new pre-certificate
stored under an integrity handle in the device.
In the following, for clarity, we use the notation C(N1, N2, N3, k, T, i, S1, S2), which is a synonym
of the concatenation of the terms N1, N2, N3, k, T, i, S1, S2 ∈ Msg, to represent a certificate of double
public key. We emphasize that the notation C(N1, N2, N3, k, T, i, S1, S2) does not imply requirements
on the type of the fields. Nonetheless, we say that a pre-certificate is well-formed if its fields correspond
to the following terms and types (we also give their semantic):
• the identifier N1 ∈ Nonce of the certificate;
• the identifier N2 ∈ Nonce of the associated private key;
• the identifier N3 ∈ Nonce of the certification public key which allows to verify the certificate;
• a double public key k ∈ Key;
• the type T ∈ T of k ;
• the associated private key handle security level (i, S1, S2) ∈ I ×S ×S .
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Thus, we typically store a pair of matching asymmetric double keys as:
• a key handle hα. (N1, N2, k, privDecSign, i, S1, S2) for the secret part,
• an integrity handle h.(N2, C(N2, N1, N3, k, pubEncVerif, i, S1, S2)) for the certificate of the public
part.
We remark that we choose to trace the association of public and private part of asymmetric key
pairs via their identifiers. This requires to have system-wide identifiers for handles, in the sense that
identifiers are independent of the secure hardware they are stored in. As a result, when importing
a pre-certificate in a device, the identifier cannot be generated at random. This explains why the
pre-certificate contains a field corresponding to its identifier.
2.5 API Rules
The model that we present is a transition system inspired by [7]. The state of the system is given by
the family {Sb|b ∈ Agent ∪ {int}}. We also consider a set of predicates P = {Pa|a ∈ Agent ∪ {int}},
where int is a particular element representing the knowledge of the attacker. The notations Pb(t) and
t ∈ Sb are equivalent.
The API is represented by a set of rules of the general form:
P1(u1), . . . , Pk(uk)
N1,...,Nm
=⇒ Pk+1(vk+1), . . . , Pl(vl),
where the ui, vi are terms, theNi are variables and the Pi are predicates. These rules are instantiated by
substituting the variables by terms of the same type. In order to explain that, let x1, . . . , xn be elements
of Var and let t1, . . . , tn be a set of terms. We denote by {x1 → t1, . . . , xn → tn} the substitution σ
which replaces the variables xi by the terms ti for i = 1, . . . , n. We say that σ is well-typed if the
variables xi and the terms ti have the same types. In the following, we only consider well-typed
substitutions. The application of the substitution σ on the term t is denoted by tσ. Classically, given
a set of rules, we say that a state S ′ is reachable from a state S if there exists an instantiated rule
in the set allowing to transition from S to S ′. We then generalize this reachability definition to the
transitive closure of a set of rules, which we denote ⇒∗.
2.6 A model of corruption
In stating our security properties, we assume that some keys stored on secure hardwares might be lost,
perhaps due to side channel attacks or other out-of-model events. We model this as shown in Figure 2:
we assume that an attacker can send arbitrary commands to all devices, and additionally, has access
to all the keys stored on those devices we refer to as belonging to dishonest agents. Other devices are
referred to as honest. This corruption model defines an order relation on the set of keys. To a key k
we can associate the set Sk of devices the corruption of which implies that of a key. A key k1 is more
secure than k2 if Sk1 ⊆ Sk2 . In other words, a key is all the more secure that there are less choices in
the devices the adversary can corrupt in order to compromise it.
3 Symbolic Security of the API
3.1 Security ordering
In the rules of our API, we put to use an order relation on the set of triples (i, S1, S2) ∈ I ×S ×S
(recall that S is the set of subsets of Agent). Let (i1, S1,1, S1,2) and (i2, S2,1, S2,2) be two elements of
I ×S ×S , we write
(i1, S1,1, S1,2) ≺ (i2, S2,1, S2,2) if i1 < i2, S2,1 ⊆ S1,1 and S2,2 ⊆ S1,2,
(i1, S1,1, S1,2)  (i2, S2,1, S2,2) if i1 ≤ i2, S2,1 ⊆ S1,1 and S2,2 ⊆ S1,2.
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Figure 2: Corruption model
It is clear that  (resp. ≺) is an order relation (resp. a strict order relation). This relation plays an
important role in the definition of the security policy of our API and the fact that it is strict ensures
that we avoid cycles of encryption, e.g. terms of the form {|{|{|. . .|}K1 |}K2 |}K1 .
This order relation may look complex but is in fact quite natural. The security level of a handle
is given by a set of devices S such that the corruption of any member of S = (S1, S2) would imply
the corruption of the handle. In the API, we want to guarantee that if a particular set S = (S1, S2)
of agents are honest (i.e. have uncorrupted HSMs), then a handle cannot be corrupted. In the case
of a public key API, the keys are split into a public part (the certificate), whose value is known to
everyone but the integrity of which must be guaranteed, and the private part which must be protected
in confidentiality and integrity. The security of a key depends on both parts, but still it is important
to be able to distinguish between these two aspects of security because we want to control the diffusion
of the private key, while the integrity of the public part may depend on a long chain of certification.
In other words, if (i, S1, S2) is a handle level, S1 should represent a list of agents upon whom the
integrity of the public part of the key depends, i.e., if any of these agents are corrupted, then the
integrity of the key is lost. The set S2 gives the legitimate users of the private key. If any of these
users are corrupted, then the private key is no longer confidential amongst these users. If the handle
contains a symmetric key then S2 has exactly the same meaning as the set S in the Cortier-Steel API.
For asymmetric keys, it may well be the case that S1 is a rather large set (e.g. tracing a certification
chain back to a root certificate) and yet we still want S2 to be as small as possible (possibly just the
user who generated the key). Finally, it should be remarked that a key k which is wrapped by another
asymmetric key k′ should inherit from k′ the control sets S1 and S2 even if k is symmetric.
Dividing the agent sets into public key and private key parts also affects our security properties.
In the Cortier-Steel API, a secret key cannot be sent to an agent a ∈ Agent outside of the control set
S: indeed, it would be a violation of the security property in the case that a is a corrupt agent. In
our setting, the security property guarantees the secrecy of a private key k if none of the agents of
S1∪S2 are corrupted. We also want to ensure that no agent in S1−S2 actually obtains the value of k,
which they should not since they are not legitimate users of the key. Both these security requirements
appear in the statement of the main result of this paper (see Theorem 1). Identifying rightful users
constitutes another important motivation for dividing the control set into two parts.
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3.2 The rules of the generic asymmetric API
We describe the transition rules defining the security API. We recall that agents do not know keys and
use handles to refer to them. Consequently, if an agent wants to export a key, he provides its handle
as an input to the corresponding API function, which replaces this latter by the value of the key and
its attributes when computing the real payload value to encrypt. Reciprocally, the injection functions
must identify these patterns and create the appropriate handle rather than output the key value as a
plaintext. Thus, we emphasize that there has to exist a distinction between handle translations and
regular messages, which we materialize by the message container nhdl. Respect of the security ordering
is enforced by appropriate checks when encrypting and decrypting payloads.
In the following rules, Ni ∈ Noncev, Xk, inv(Xk), Yk, inv(Yk) ∈ Keyv, Si ⊆ Agent and i (possibly
indexed by an agent name) denotes an element in I.
Symmetric key generation This rule allows the generation of key Xk of level i and control sets
(S1, S2) by the agent e for the set of users S2, which is modeled by the following handle creation:
i, S1, S2
N,Xk=⇒ Pe(hge(N,Null, Xk, symEncDec, i, S1, S2 ∪ {e})) (Sym Gen)
Symmetric encryption This rule allows agent b to encrypt with the key Xk (to which he has a
handle), a payload consisting of messages and handles m1, . . . ,mn, where handles are translated into
key values and attributes.
Pb(h
α
b (N,Null, Xk, symEncDec, i, S1, S2)), Pb(m1), . . . , Pb(mn)
=⇒Pb({|m′1, . . . ,m′n|}Xk), (Sym Encrypt)
with b ∈ S2, mj ,m′j ∈ Msg and for j = 1, . . . , n :
• if mj = hαb (Nj , N
′
j , Xk,j , Tj , ij , Sj,1, Sj,2) with Xk,j = Keyv ∪ Noncev then
– if i ∈ I2, b ∈ Agent and (ij , Sj,1, Sj,2) ≺ (i, S1, S2) then we let
m′j = Nj , N
′
j , Xk,j , Tj , ij , Sj,1, Sj,2 ;
– else m′j = ∅.
• else m′j = nhdl(mj).
Symmetric decryption The following rule lets agent b, provided he knows a handle pointing to
key Xk, decrypt a ciphertext. Whenever a pattern consisting of a key and attributes is identified, it
results in a suitable handle creation. Otherwise, the plaintext is output.
Pb(h
α
b (N,Null, Xk, symEncDec, i, S1, S2)), Pb({|m1, . . . ,mn|}Xk)
=⇒Pb(m′1), . . . , Pb(m′n), (Sym Decrypt)
with b ∈ S2, mj ,m′j ∈ Msg and moreover for j = 1, . . . , n :
• if mj = Nj , N ′j , Xk,j , Tj , ij , Sj,1, Sj,2, then
– if i ∈ I2, (ij , Sj,1, Sj,2) ≺ (i, S1, S2) then we set
m′j = h
r
b(Nj , N
′
j , Xk,j , Tj , ij , Sj,1, Sj,2);
– else m′j = ∅.
• else
– if mj = nhdl(tj) with tj ∈ Msg then m′j = tj ;
– else m′j = ∅.
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Asymmetric encryption/signature double key generation The following rule allows agent e,
given a certification key pair under handles1, to generate (Xk, inv(Xk)) of level i2 and control sets
(S1, S2) for agent b. Note that generation and certificate issue are part of a single rule. This allows us
to eliminate the need for a certification command, for which deciding the key authenticity could raise
a problem.
Pe(h
α
e (N1, N2, inv(Yk),privCertSign, i1, Se,1, Se,2)),
Pe(he(N2, C(N2, N1, Ncert, Yk, pubCertVerif, i1, Se,1, Se,2))), i2, S1, S2, b N3,N4,Xk=⇒
Pe(h
g
e(N3, N4, inv(Xk), privDecSign, i2, Se,1 ∪ Se,2 ∪ S1 ∪ {e}, {b, e} ∪ S2)),
Pe(Σ(C(N4, N3, N2, Xk, pubEncVerif, i2, Se,1 ∪ Se,2 ∪ S1 ∪ {e}, {b, e} ∪ S2), inv(Yk))), (Asym Gen)
with e ∈ Se,2, i1, i2 ∈ I>0, α ∈ {r, g} on condition that i2 < i1.
Asymmetric encryption with signature This API command enables an agent b, owner of a
private handle pointing to an asymmetric key Yk, to encrypt and sign a payload for agent c, provided
b has an integrity handle for a public key Xk of c. As in the symmetric case, handles in payload
m1, . . . ,mn are translated into real values and attributes. Encryption and signature needs to be an
atomic command to enable the device to control what can be signed.
Pb(h
α
b (N1, N2, inv(Yk),privDecSign, ib, Sb,1, Sb,2),
Pb(hb(N3, C(N3, N4, N5, Xk, pubEncVerif, ic, Sc,1, Sc,2))),
Pb(m1), . . . , Pb(mn)=⇒Pb({m′1, . . . ,m′n}Xk), Pb(Σ({m′1, . . . ,m′n}Xk , inv(Yk))),
(Asym SignEncrypt)
with ib, ic ∈ I>0, c ∈ Sc,2, mj ,m′j ∈ Msg and for j = 1, . . . , n :
• if mj = hαb (Nj , N
′
j , Xk,j , Tj , ij , Sj,1, Sj,2) with Xk,j ∈ Keyv ∪ Noncev then :
– if ib, ic ∈ I2, (ij , Sj,1, Sj,2) ≺ (ib, Sb,1, Sb,2) and (ij , Sj,1, Sj,2) ≺ (ic, Sc,1, Sc,2) then m′j =
Nj , N
′
j , Xk,j , Tj , ij , Sj,1, Sj,2;
– else m′j = ∅.
• else m′j = nhdl(mj).
Asymmetric decryption with signature verification The following rule allows for decryption
by the agent b of an authenticated ciphertext, using an integrity handle pointing to a public key Yk to
verify the signature and a handle pointing to a key inv(Xk) to decrypt the ciphertext.
Pb(hb(N1, C(N1, N2, N3, Yk,pubEncVerif, ic, Sc,1, Sc,2))),
Pb(h
α
b (N4, N5, inv(Xk), privDecSign, ib, Sb,1, Sb,2)),
Pb({m1, . . . ,mn}Xk), Pb(Σ({m1, . . . ,mn}Xk , inv(Yk)))
=⇒Pb(m′1), . . . , Pb(m′n), (Asym VerifDecrypt)
with ib, ic ∈ I>0, mj ,m′j ∈ Msg and for j = 1, . . . , n :
• if mj = Nj , N ′j , Xk,j , Tj , ij , Sj,1, Sj,2 then
1We require that both parts of the certification key exist in the creating agent’s secure hardware. This is not a
compulsory security constraint, in the sense that a few modifications can be performed in the rules and proof to get rid
of it. However, it seems reasonable in practice to perform such a verification.
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– if ib, ic ∈ I2, (ij , Sj,2, Sj,2) ≺ (ib, Sb,1, Sb,2) and (ij , Sj,2, Sj,2) ≺ (ic, Sc,1, Sc,2) then m′j =
hrb(Nj , N
′
j , Xk,j , Tj , ij , Sj,1, Sj,2);
– else m′j = ∅.
• if mj = nhdl(tj) for tj ∈ Msg then m′j = tj .
Certification key generation Given a certification key pair under handles, this rule allows agent e
to generate a certification key pair (Xk, inv(Xk)) for agent b. As for asymmetric generation, generation
and certificate issue are part of an atomic call. It eliminates the need for a certification command, for
which deciding the key authenticity could raise a problem.
Pe(h
α
e (N1, N2, inv(Yk),privCertSign, ie, Se,1, Se,2)),
Pe(he(N2, C(N2, N1, Ncert, Yk, pubCertVerif, ie, Se,1, Se,2))), ib, S1, S2 N3,N4,Xk=⇒
Pe(h
g
e(N3, N4, inv(Xk), privCertSign, ib, Se,1 ∪ Se,2 ∪ S1 ∪ {e}, {e, b} ∪ S2)),
Pe(Σ(C(N4, N3, N2, Xk, pubCertVerif, ib, Se,1 ∪ Se,2 ∪ S1 ∪ {e}, {e, b} ∪ S2), inv(Yk))),
(Cert Gen)
with e ∈ Se,2, ie ∈ I2 and ib ≤ ie.
Verification of a certificate This rule allows an agent b, given an integrity handle pointing to a
verification key and a pre-certificate signed by the matching certification key, to create the suitable
integrity handle. For Θ ∈ {EncVerif,CertVerif},
Pb(Σ(C(N1, N2, N3, Xk, pubΘ, ic, Sc,1, Sc,2), inv(Yk))),
Pb(hb(N3, C(N3, N4, N5, Yk,pubCertVerif, ie, Se,1, Se,2)))=⇒
Pb(hb(N1, C(N1, N2, N3, Xk, pubΘ, ic, Sc,1, Sc,2))), (Cert Verif)
with ic, ie ∈ I>0 and (ic, Sc,1,∅) ≺ (ie, Se,1 ∪ Se,2,∅).
3.3 Example
In Figure 3 we show the ‘before’ and ‘after’ states for three agents using the API in a typical configura-
tion. In the ‘before’ state, there are no shared secrets. Alice and Bob both have accepted a copy of the
CA’s public key certificate and placed it under an integrity handle (identifiers 5 and 8 respectively) and
they have generated their own public-private keypairs. The CA has accepted public key certificates
for each of these pairs (identifiers 3 and 4). Here we are using integers to label key levels, arbitrarily
assigning the long term keys the level 3. Public keys are level 0.
To establish a shared secret, Alice and Bob first need to accept each others public key certificates.
This can be done by requesting them from the CA. The CA uses the AsymEncryptSign command
to sign the (public) message containging the certificate. Now Alice and Bob can use the certificate
verification command to accept the certificates, generating handles 11 and 12.
Now either Alice can generate a symmetric key (handle 13) and send it to Bob using AsymEn-
cryptSign. Bob will use AsymDecryptVerify and accept the key (handle 14). Now Alice and Bob can
exchange messages using the new symmetric key. Note that the new symmetric key is confidential
between Alice and Bob, hence has a confidentiality control set S2 containing only these identifiers, but
for integrity it has inherited the dependence on the CA, hence S1 contains the set of agents CA, Alice
and Bob.
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CA
Alice
Bob
hCA(1, 2, inv(KCA),privCertSign, 3, {CA}, {CA})
hCA(2, C(., ., .,KCA, pubCertVerif, 3, {CA}, {CA}))
hCA(3, C(., ., .,KA,pubCertVerif, 3, {A,CA}, {A}))
hCA(4, C(., ., .,KB,pubCertVerif, 3, {B,CA}, {B}))
hA(5, C(., ., .,KCA, pubCertVerif, 3, {CA}, {CA}))
hA(6, C(., ., .,KA, pubCertVerif, 3, {A,CA}, {A}))
hA(7, 6, inv(KA),privCertSign, 3, {A,CA}, {A})
hB(5, C(., ., .,KCA, pubCertVerif, 3, {CA}, {CA}))
hB(6, C(., ., .,KA,pubCertVerif, 3, {A,CA}, {A}))
hB(7, 6, inv(KA), privCertSign, 3, {A,CA}, {A})
CA
Alice
Bob
hCA(1, 2, inv(KCA),privCertSign, 3, {CA}, {CA})
hCA(2, C(., ., .,KCA, pubCertVerif, 3, {CA}, {CA}))
hCA(3, C(., ., .,KA,pubCertVerif, 3, {A,CA}, {A}))
hCA(4, C(., ., .,KB,pubCertVerif, 3, {B,CA}, {B}))
hA(5, C(., ., .,KCA, pubCertVerif, 3, {CA}, {CA}))
hA(6, C(., ., .,KA, pubCertVerif, 3, {A,CA}, {A}))
hA(7, 6, inv(KA),privCertSign, 3, {A,CA}, {A})
hA(11, C(., ., .,KB, pubCertVerif, 3, {B,CA}, {B}))
hA(13, , inv(KAB), symEncDec, 2, {A,B,CA}, {A,B})
hB(5, C(., ., .,KCA, pubCertVerif, 3, {CA}, {CA}))
hB(6, C(., ., .,KA,pubCertVerif, 3, {A,CA}, {A}))
hB(7, 6, inv(KA), privCertSign, 3, {A,CA}, {A})
hB(12, C(., ., .,KA, pubCertVerif, 3, {A,CA}, {A}))
hA(14, , inv(KAB), symEncDec, 2, {A,B,CA}, {A,B})
Figure 3: Operation of the API. See 3.3 for narration.
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3.4 Security rationale
Below we will formally prove security properties for our design, but first we discuss the design features
that prevent it from suffering from the kinds of attacks seen in the literature [2, 3, 5]. First, a vital
step in several attacks against security APIs is the ability to change the value of the attributes of a key
over time or from one component to another. Our design, much as the Cortier-Steel design, prevents
such attempts in two ways. Firstly, the attributes of a key are set once and for all when it is generated
or imported onto a device. Secondly, when transporting keys, we export all attributes along with the
value of the key and protect their integrity.
In the specification of the widely used API PKCS#11, a key can posess conflicting attributes, such
as ‘Wrap’ and ‘Decrypt’ leading to attacks [6]. These attacks are not possible in our design because of
the distinction between the way keys and data are tagged for encryption: either as a concatenation of
key and attributes or encapsulated in a container nhdl. In an implementation of our design, a suitable
tagging scheme should be used to ensure this distinction.
Key conjuring, i.e. the ability of the adversary to generate any number of (possibly related) keys on
the device, is critical to a number of attacks [2]. Careful design of the decrypt command prevents this.
The security proof incudes an enumeration of the terms which the adversary can successfully submit to
a decryption request (see (Sign) and (SymEnc)). Roughly, suitable terms are either wrapped under
compromised keys or result from an honest use of the encrypt command.
4 Security of the API in the symbolic model
4.1 Model of security
In this section, we describe the capacity of the attacker in the spirit of Dolev and Yao [9], as formalized
in [1].
4.1.1 Computation of new terms
We denote by INTRUDER the set of rules which allow the attacker to build new terms from the ones
that it has already.
Creation/destruction of pairs Let m1,m2 ∈ Msg, we have:
• Pint(m1), Pint(m2)⇒ Pint(< m1,m2 >)
• Pint(< m1,m2 >)⇒ Pint(m1), Pint(m2)
Symmetric encryption/decryption let Xk ∈ Keyv, m1, . . . ,mn ∈ Msg, we have :
• Pint(Xk), Pint(m1), . . . , Pint(mn)⇒ Pint({|m1, . . . ,mn|}Xk)
• Pint(Xk), Pint({|m1, . . . ,mn|}Xk)⇒ Pint(m1), . . . , Pint(mn)
Asymmetric encryption/decryption Let Xk ∈ Keyv, m1, . . . ,mn ∈ Msg, we have :
• Pint(Xk), Pint(m1), . . . , Pint(mn)⇒ Pint({m1, . . . ,mn}Xk)
• Pint(inv(Xk)), Pint({m1, . . . ,mn}Xk)⇒ Pint(m1), . . . , Pint(mn)
Signature Let Xk ∈ Keyv, m ∈ Msg, we have :
• Pint(Xk), Pint(m)⇒ Pint(Σ(m,Xk))
• Pint(Σ(m,Xk))⇒ Pint(m)
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Creation/destruction of container of regular messages Let m ∈ Msg, we have :
• Pint(m)⇒ Pint(nhdl(m))
• Pint(nhdl(m))⇒ Pint(m)
The transitive reflexive closure of the preceding rules can be interpreted as the set of terms that an
attacker can deduce from its knowledge at a certain state. In the following, we say that m is deducible
from a set of terms T , that we denote by T ` m, if starting from the state S such that Sint = T and
for all a ∈ Agent, Sa = ∅, there exists a state S ′ such that S =⇒∗INTRUDER S ′ and m ∈ S ′int. In the
following, we will do the following abuse of notation : if t is a term and S is a state, we write t ∈ S
(resp. S ` t) if t ∈ ∪b∈Agent∪{int}Sb (resp. if ∪b∈Agent∪{int}Sb ` t).
4.1.2 Control of the network and corruption
Control of the network Let a be an agent m a message.
• Pa(m)⇒ Pint(m)
• Pint(m)⇒ Pa(m)
In the following, we suppose given a set H a honest agents.
Corruption of a device Let a be a dishonest agent (i.e. a /∈ H) and
hαa (N1, N2,m, T, i, S1, S2),
a handle then
Pa(h
α
a (N1, N2,m, T, i, S1, S2))⇒ Pint(m).
4.2 Initial states
Secure hardware devices are set up in a controlled environment. We impose a few requirements on the
state of a device at the end of the initialisation process. We consider states satisfying these conditions as
initial states for the transition system defined by the set of API and adversary rules. These requirements
seem realistic in pratice and allow us to start from states compatible with the security policy. In the
initial states, we assume that the attacker knows some public information like the set of key levels and
the set of agents.
Definition 1. A state S0 is said to be initial if it satisfies the following hypotheses :
1. the set of terms known by the agents and the intruder are atomic : for all a ∈ Agent ∪ {int},
Sa ⊆ Handle ∪ Key ∪ Nonce ∪ Agent ∪ T ∪ I ∪S and moreover T ∪ I ∪S ⊆ Sint.
2. all terms stored under handles are secret : for a ∈ Agent,
if hαa (N1, N2,m, T, i, S1, S2) ∈ Sa then for b ∈ Agent ∪ {int}, m /∈ Sb.
3. all key handles known by an agent point to an atomic element : for a ∈ Agent, if hαa (N1, N2,m, T, i, S1, S2) ∈
Sa then m ∈ Key ∪ Nonce.
4. the owner of a key handle is in the set of legitimate users. More precisely, we impose that for all
a ∈ Agent, if hαa (N1, N2,m, T, i, S1, S2) ∈ Sa then a ∈ S2.
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5. any public key certificate under handle corresponds to a private key stored by a rightful agent:
∀b ∈ Agent, if hb(N1, C(N1, N2, N3, Xk, pubΘ, i, S1, S2)) ∈ Sb, then there exists a ∈ S2 so that
hαa (N2, N1, inv(Xk), privΘ
′, i, S1, S2) ∈ Sa,
with (Θ,Θ′) ∈ {(EncVerif,DecSign), (CertVerif,CertSign)}.
6. the key handles form a coherent set: for all a, a′ ∈ Agent, hαa (N1, N2,m, T, i, S1, S2) ∈ Sa and
hα
′
a′ (N
′
1, N
′
2,m, T
′, i′, S′1, S′2) ∈ Sa′ then N1 = N ′1, T = T ′, i = i′, N2 = N ′2, S1 = S′1 and S2 = S′2.
We can now define the set of states for which we can prove a security property.
Definition 2. We say that a state S is accessible from an initial state S0 if it is reachable by ap-
plying a finite number of times the rules of the set API, INTRUDER and CONTROL to S0, i.e. if
S0 ⇒∗API∪CONTROL∪INTRUDER S.
4.3 Security properties and sketch of proof
The security of the API can be expressed in the following way: given a state S, secret data of honest
agents should not be known to the intruder. But we would also like to ensure that this data is only
used by rightful agents. Secret data of honest users are messages m ∈ Msg for which there exists a
handle of the form hαa (., .,m, ., ., S1, S2) with a ∈ H and S1, S2 ⊆ H. As the set of legitimate users of
m is S2, the property that we want to prove is formalized as:
∀a ∈ H,∀m ∈ Msg, ∀i ∈ I>0, ∀α ∈ {r, g}, ∀S1, S2 ⊆ H, S ` hαa (., .,m, ., i, S1, S2) ⇒ S 0 m
and a ∈ S2 (Sec)
We can now give the principal result of this paper, stating the security of our API (Sec) if it is
correctly initialised.
Theorem 1 (Confidentiality of data under handles). Let S0 be an initial state and S be an accessible
state from S0. Then S satisfies the property (Sec).
Proof. We present in this section a sketch of proof, to provide some intuitions about the way it works.
Details can be found in section 5. We first begin to consider a more powerful attacker which has access
to all the values stored in compromised hardware as well as to all the messages m associated to handles
of the form hαa (., .,m, ., ., S1, S2) where S1, S2 ( H even if a is honest. The underlying idea is that
the classic adversary can easily learn these terms anyway. Moreover, this extension allows to ensure
stability of the intruder’s knowledge when applying rules from set INTRUDER ∪ CONTROL.
It yields a generalized deduction definition: we write that S `∗ t when ∪b∈Agent∪{int}Sb∪{m,N1, N2|hαa (N1, N2,
m, ., ., S1, S2) ∈ S, S1 ( H or S2 ( H, a ∈ Agent} ∪ {m,N1, N2|hαa (N1, N2,m, ., ., ., .) ∈ S, a /∈
H} ∪ {m|ha(.,m) ∈ S} ` t.
We then consider a stronger version of the property (Sec):
∀a ∈ H,∀m ∈ Msg, ∀i ∈ I>0, ∀α ∈ {r, g}, ∀S1, S2 ⊆ H, S `∗ hαa (., .,m, ., i, S1, S2) ⇒ S 0∗ m,
a ∈ S2 and m ∈ Key ∪ Nonce. (Sec∗)
Intuitively, the property (Sec∗) means that the values stored in the handles of honest agents are always
of type Key or Nonce and are not deducible even with the extended deduction rule `∗. It is clear that
in order to prove the theorem, it is enough to prove the same statement with the stronger version of
the property (Sec).
In the next section, we prove by induction that the property (Sec∗) is invariant by the API rules.
Intuitively, all keys deducible from an initial state in the extended sense are compromised keys (in the
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sense that there is an agent owning the handle or appearing in the control sets that is dishonest). The
idea behind the induction is to show that this remains true after each API function call. (We recall
that stability by INTRUDER ∪ CONTROL follows from the use of the extended deducibility notion.)
To prove this, we introduce four invariants2 to show the inability of an adversary to create interesting
wrapped secret keys or signed certificates allowing him to extract secret data from a security device.
The first invariant, denoted (SymEnc), states that the only well-formed symmetric encryption terms
that an adversary can build are either encrypted under a compromised key, or resulting from an honest
and well-formed request to the symmetric encryption command. If the latter is true, we know that the
key hierarchy is preserved because of the design of the encryption command. Otherwise, potential keys
appearing under encryption were already deducible (in the extended sense) by the adversary. More
formally, the invariant can be written as follows:
∀u, k ∈ Msg,S `∗ {|u|}k ⇒ S `∗ k or
∃i ∈ I>0, ∃S1, S2 ⊂ H ∃a ∈ S2 such that S `∗ h.a(., ., k, ., i, S1, S2)
∃u′1, . . . , u′p ∈ Msg such that u = u′1, . . . , u′p with ∀j = 1 . . . p,
either ∃mj ∈ Key ∪ Nonce,∃Tj ∈ T, ∃(ij , Sj,1, Sj,2) ∈ (I ×S ×S ),∃(Nj,1, Nj,2) ∈ Nonce2 such that
u′j = Nj,1, Nj,2,mj , Tj , ij , Sj,1, Sj,2, (ij , Sj,1, Sj,2) ≺ (i, S1, S2) and
S `∗ h.a(Nj,1, Nj,2,mj , Tj , ij , Sj,1, Sj,2)
or ∃mj ∈ Msg such that m′j = nhdl(mj) and S `∗ mj . (SymEnc)
The next invariant states that the only asymmetric encryption terms deducible from a state acces-
sible from an initial state either have a payload deducible by the attacker, or result from an honest
and well-formed request to the asymmetric encryption command.
∀u,K ∈ Msg,S `∗ {u}K ⇒ S `∗ u or
∃Sb,1, Sb,2 ⊂ Agent, ∃b ∈ Sb,2, ∃ib ∈ I such that S `∗ h.b(., ., k,privDecSign, ib, Sb,1, Sb,2)
∃Sc,1, Sc,2 ⊂ Agent,∃ic ∈ I, ∃K ∈ Key such that
S `∗ hb(., C(., ., .,K,pubEncVerif, ic, Sc,1, Sc,2))
∃u′1, . . . , u′p ∈ Msg such that u = u′1, . . . , u′p with ∀j = 1 . . . p,
either ∃mj ∈ Key ∪ Nonce,∃Tj ∈ T, ∃(ij , Sj,1, Sj,2) ∈ (I ×S ×S ), ∃(Nj,1, Nj,2) ∈ Nonce2 such that
u′j = Nj,1, Nj,2,mj , Tj , ij , Sj,1, Sj,2, (ij , Sj,1, Sj,2) ≺ (ib, Sb,1, Sb,2), (ij , Sj,1, Sj,2) ≺ (ic, Sc,1, Sc,2) and
S `∗ h.b(Nj,1, Nj,2,mj , Tj , ij , Sj,1, Sj,2) or ∃mj ∈ Msg such that u′j = nhdl(mj) and S `∗ mj
(AsymEnc)
We need a similar invariant for signed terms the adversary is able to obtain. Once again, the idea
is to show that if the adversary has not compromised the signing or certifying key, the signed terms he
can build follow directly from an honest API call. The invariant here is slightly more involved since
we have to deal with both the issue of certificates when generating asymmetric keys and asymmetric
wrapping commands. This is formalized in invariant (Sign) as follows:
2Our submitted paper mentioned only three invariants. The fourth was added to enable us to weaken the restrictions
on the asymmetric encryption and decryption commands to make them more widely applicable.
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∀u, k ∈ Msg,S `∗ Σ(u, k)⇒ S `∗ k or
∃b ∈ Agent, ∃e ∈ Agent,∃i1, i2 ∈ I, ∃N2, N3, N4 ∈ Nonce,∃S′1, S′2, S1, S2 ⊂ Agent, ∃Xk ∈ Keyv such that
u = C(N4, N3, N2, Xk, pubΘ, i2, S1 ∪ {e}, S2 ∪ {b, e}) and
S `∗ h.e(., ., k,privCertSign, i1, S′1, S′2) with S′1 ∪ S′2 ⊂ S1, e ∈ S′2 ⊂ Agent, i2 < i1
or
∃Sb,1, Sb,2 ⊂ Agent, ∃b ∈ Sb,2,∃ib ∈ I such that S `∗ h.b(., ., k,privDecSign, ib, Sb,1, Sb,2)
∃Sc,1, Sc,2 ⊂ Agent,∃ic ∈ I, ∃K ∈ Key such that
S `∗ hb(., C(., ., .,K,pubEncVerif, ic, Sc,1, Sc,2))
∃u′1, . . . , u′p ∈ Msg such that u = {u′1, . . . , u′p}K with ∀j = 1 . . . p,
either ∃mj ∈ Key ∪ Nonce, ∃Tj ∈ T, ∃(ij , Sj,1, Sj,2) ∈ (I ×S ×S ), ∃(Nj,1, Nj,2) ∈ Nonce2 such that
u′j = Nj,1, Nj,2,mj , Tj , ij , Sj,1, Sj,2, (ij , Sj,1, Sj,2) ≺ (ib, Sb,1, Sb,2), (ij , Sj,1, Sj,2) ≺ (ic, Sc,1, Sc,2)) and
S `∗ h.b(Nj,1, Nj,2,mj , Tj , ij , Sj,1, Sj,2)
or ∃mj ∈ Msg such that u′j = nhdl(mj) and S `∗ mj (Sign)
for Θ ∈ {EncVerif,CertSign}.
Intuitively, the property (Cert) means that if a certificate is under an integrity handle with control
sets S1, S2 containing only honest users, then there exists a private key handle associated to this
certificate the attributes of which are coherent with that of the certificate.
∀a ∈ H,∀N1, N2, N3 ∈ Nonce, ∀i ∈ I>0, ∀S1, S2 ⊆ H with
S `∗ ha(N1, C(N1, N2, N3, Xk, pubΘ, i, S1, S2)) ⇒ ∃b ∈ S2 such that
S `∗ hαb (N2, N1, inv(Xk), privΘ′, i, S1, S2). (Cert)
where (Θ,Θ′) ∈ {(EncVerif,DecSign), (CertVerif,CertSign)}.
To finish the sketch of proof, we remark moreover that from its definition, an initial state satisfies
the properties (Sec∗), (SymEnc), (AsymEnc) (Cert), (Sign).
5 Detailed proof
In this section, we provide a detailed proof of Theorem 1. We want to show that the properties (Sec∗),
(SymEnc), (AsymEnc), (Cert), (Sign) are invariant by application of the rules API∪ INTRUDER∪
CONTROL. We remark that transitions of set API can create fresh handles, symmetric and asymmetric
encrypted messages, or signatures. The following technical lemma proves useful repeatedly during the
proof. It states that from handles, encrypted messages the decryption key of which is unknown to him
and from signatures, the attacker can not create new terms which are useful for its purpose.
Lemma 1. Let k1, k2 ∈ Key and let t1, t2 ∈ Msg. We denote by f the symmetric or asymmetric
encryption function. Let S and S′ be sets of terms such that
S′ ⊆ S ∪ {f(t1, k1)} ∪ {Σ(t2, k2)} ∪ Hdls ∪ NK
with NK a set of elements of Key∪Nonce∪Agent∪T ∪I∪S which do not appear in S∪{f(t1, k1)}∪ {Σ(t2, k2)}
and Hdls ⊆ Handle a set of handles which are either
• of the form hαa (., ., k, ., ., S1, S2) with S1 ∪ S2 ∪ {a} ⊆ H, or S1 ∪ S2 ∪ {a} * H, and then we
suppose that S `∗ k or that k ∈ NK;
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• or of the form ha(., N) with a ∈ Agent and S `∗ N or NK ` N .
We suppose moreover that S∪{f(t1, k1)}∪NK `∗ t2 and that k′1 - with k′1 = k1 if k1 is a symmetric
key (resp. k′1 = inv(k1) if k1 is an asymmetric key) - and k2 are not deducible from S, that is to say
that S 0∗ k′1, S 0∗ k2, k′1, k2 /∈ NK. Let u ∈ Agent ∪ Nonce ∪ Key ∪ Handle be an atomic message. We
have :
S′ `∗ u if and only if S `∗ u or u ∈ Hdls or u ∈ NK. (1)
Moreover, let v ∈ Msg and w ∈ Key, then we have
S′ `∗ {|v|}w and S′ 0∗ w only if S `∗ {|v|}w or {|v|}w = f(t1, k1), (2)
S′ `∗ {v}w and S′ 0∗ v only if S `∗ {v}w or {v}w = f(t1, k1), (3)
S′ `∗ Σ(v, w) and S′ 0∗ w only if S `∗ Σ(v, w) or Σ(v, w) = Σ(t2, k2). (4)
Remark 1. In the statement, when we say that an element of NK does not appear in S∪{f(t1, k1)}∪ {Σ(t2, k2)}
this means in particular that if inv(k) ∈ NK then k does not appear in S ∪ {f(t1, k1)} ∪ {Σ(t2, k2)}.
Proof. We let S∞ = {u|S `∗ u}, S′0 = S′ ∪ S∞ ⊆ S∞ ∪ {f(t1, k1)} ∪ {Σ(t2, k2)} ∪ Hdls ∪ NK and we
consider the sets (S′i)i∈N defined inductively by:
S′i+1 = S
′
i ∪ {u|S′i ∪∆i ⇒R u,R ∈ INTRUDER},
where ∆i = {m,N1, N2|hαa (N1, N2,m, ., ., S1, S2) ∈ S′i, S1 ( H or S2 ( H, a ∈ Agent} ∪ {m,N1, N2|
hαa (N1, N2,m, ., ., ., .) ∈ S′i, a /∈ H} ∪ {m|ha(.,m) ∈ S′i}. On the other side, we let F ′i = S′i − S∞. We
show by induction that
u ∈ (Agent ∪ Nonce ∪ Key ∪ Handle) ∩ F ′i ⇒ u ∈ Hdls ∪ NK, (5)
∀v ∈ Msg,∀w ∈ Key,Σ(v, w) ∈ S′i andw /∈ S′i ⇒ Σ(v, w) ∈ S∞ or Σ(v, w) = Σ(t2, k2), (6)
∀v ∈ Msg, ∀w ∈ Key, {|v|}w ∈ S′i and w /∈ S′i ⇒ {|v|}w ∈ S∞ or {|v|}w = f(t1, k1), (7)
∀v ∈ Msg, ∀w ∈ Key, {v}w ∈ S′i and v /∈ S′i ⇒ {v}w ∈ S∞ or {v}w = f(t1, k1). (8)
At the same time, we prove that S′i is included in the union of
A = S∞ ∪ f(t1, k1) ∪ Σ(t2, k2) ∪ Hdls ∪ NK, (9)
Bi =< m1,m2 > with m1,m2 ∈ S′i−1, (10)
Ci = {|m1, . . . ,mn|}K with m1, . . . ,mn,K ∈ S′i−1, (11)
Di = {m1, . . . ,mn}K with m1, . . . ,mn,K ∈ S′i−1, (12)
Ei = Σ(m1,K) with m1,K ∈ S′i−1, (13)
Fi = nhdl(m) with m ∈ S′i−1. (14)
It is clear that the induction hypothesis is verified for S′0 (by setting S′−1 = ∅). Suppose that the
hypothesis are true for S′i, we prove the hypothesis for S
′
i+1.
We begin by remarking that because of the hypothesis made on the handles of Hdls, we have
∆i ⊂ S∞ ∪ NK. Thus, we have S′i+1 = S′i ∪ {u|S′i ⇒R u,R ∈ INTRUDER}. For all i ∈ N, we let
Hi = A ∪Bi ∪ Ci ∪Di ∪ Ei ∪ Fi. We first prove that S′i+1 ⊆ Hi+1. For this, we remark that from the
induction hypothesis, S′i = Hi ⊆ Hi+1 and by definition S′i+1 = S′i ∪ {u|S′i ⇒R u,R ∈ INTRUDER}.
Thus, it suffices to check that {u|S′i ⇒R u,R ∈ INTRUDER} ⊆ Hi+1 by reviewing all the rules of
INTRUDER in order to prove that S′i+1 ⊆ Hi+1 :
• pair creation : this corresponds to the set Bi+1.
• pair destruction : as S′i = Hi, every pair of S
′
i is either given by the set Bi or is in S∞. In all cases,
an application of the pair destruction rule is going to create an element of S′i−1 ⊆ S′i ⊆ Hi+1.
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• symmetric encryption : this corresponds to the set Ci+1.
• symmetric decryption : because of (5) and S 0∗ k′1, k′1 (with the notation of the statement of
the lemma) is not in S′i. By applying the induction hypothesis for S
′
i = Hi, the decryption rule
can only apply to an encrypted term of Ci or S∞. For the first case, this gives elements of
S′i−1 ⊆ S′i ⊆ Hi+1. In the second case, the decryption rule is applied to a term of the form {|m|}k.
Assertion (5) and the fact that the elements of NK do not appear in S yield k ∈ S∞. Thus the
definition of S∞ implies m ∈ S∞ ⊆ Hi+1.
• asymmetric encryption : this corresponds to the set Di+1.
• asymmetric decryption : because of (5) and S 0∗ k′1, k′1 is not in S′i. Thus, by applying the
induction hypothesis S′i ⊆ Hi, the decryption rule can only apply to an encrypted term of the
set Di or to a term of S∞. In the first case, we obtain elements of S′i−1 ⊆ S′i ⊆ Hi+1. In the
second case, because of the fact that the elements of NK do not appear in S and assertion (5),
the term is necessarily of the form {m}k with inv(k) ∈ S∞. Thus, the definition of S∞ provides
m ∈ S∞ ⊆ Hi+1.
• signature: this corresponds to the set Ei+1.
• signature decomposition: by application of the induction hypothesis S′i ⊆ Hi, the signature
decomposition rule can only apply to a signed term of S∞, to the set Ei or to Σ(t2, k2). In the
first case, this gives a term of S∞, in the second case, we obtain a term of S′i−1 ⊆ S′i ⊆ Hi+1 and
in the last case, this gives t2 which is by hypothesis deducible from S∞ ∪ {f(t1, k1)} ∪ NK. As
this last set is included in A, t2 ∈ Hi+1.
• message encapsulation: this corresponds to the set Fi+1.
• message decapsulation: as S′i = Hi, every encapsulated term of S
′
i is either given by the set
Fi or is in S∞. In all cases, an application of the decapsulation rule creates an element of
S′i−1 ⊆ S′i ⊆ Hi+1.
We can now prove the other assertions:
• assertion (5) : as S′i+1 ⊆ H ′i+1, we know that S′i+1 is included in the union of A = S∞∪f(t1, k1)∪
Σ(t2, k2) ∪ Hdls ∪NK ⊆ S′i and of non-atomic terms. Since A ⊆ S′i, we conclude by applying the
induction hypothesis (5).
• assertion (7) : if {|v |}w ∈ S′i+1 and w /∈ S′i+1 then {|v |}w is not in the set Ci+1 and thus {|v |}w is
in the set A which allows to conclude.
• assertion (8) : if {v}w ∈ S′i+1 and v /∈ S′i+1 then {v}w is not in the set Di+1 and thus {v}w is in
the set A which allows to conclude.
• assertion (6) : ditto the preceding proof.
In order to finish the proof, we just have to remark that by definition ∪i∈NS′i = {u|S′ `∗ u}.
First, we use Lemma 1 in order to check that every initial state (see Definition 1) satisfies the
properties (Sec∗), (Cert), (SymEnc), (AsymEnc) (Sign). Let S0 be an initial state. Let
A = {m,N1, N2|hαa (N1, N2,m, ., ., S1, S2) ∈ S0, S1 ( H or S2 ( H, a ∈ Agent}∪
{m,N1, N2|hαa (N1, N2,m, ., ., ., .) ∈ S0, a /∈ H} ∪ {m|ha(.,m) ∈ S0}.
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Now writing S0,b for b’s knowledge in S0, we let
NK = A ∪b∈Agent∪{int} (S0,b − Handle),
Hdls = ∪b∈Agent∪{int}S0,b ∩ Handle.
Let S′ = NK ∪ Hdls. It is clear from the definition of `∗ that {u|S0 `∗ u} = {u|S′ `∗ u}. Let
h ∈ Handle be so that S′ `∗ h, from Lemma 1 conclusion (1) (since S = ∅, we have h ∈ Hdls.
Suppose now that h = hαa (N1, N2,m, ., ., S1, S2). Lemma 1 conclusion (1) tells us that if S′ `∗ m then
m ∈ NK which is only possible if {a} ∪ S1 ∪ S1 * H from the Definition 1. We deduce that for all
hαa (N1, N2,m, ., ., S1, S2) ∈ Handle so that {a} ∪ S1 ∪ S2 ⊆ H, S′ 0∗ m and m ∈ Keyv ∪ Noncev which
is exactly property (Sec∗). By applying Lemma 1 conclusion (2), we obtain that if S′ `∗ {|v |}w then
necessarily S′ `∗ w which proves (SymEnc). By applying Lemma 1 conclusion (3), we obtain that
if S′ `∗ {v}w then necessarily S′ `∗ v which proves (AsymEnc). Ditto for the signature, Lemma
1 conclusion (4) tells us that if S′ `∗ Σ(u, k) then S′ `∗ k which proves property (Sign). To finish,
(Cert) is an immediate consequence of the definition of an initial state and of the fact that every
deducible handle of S′ is in Hdls from Lemma 1 conclusion (1).
We are ready to prove Theorem 1. Let S be a state satisfying the properties (Sec∗), (Cert),
(SymEnc), (AsymEnc), (Sign), and let S ′ be such that S ⇒R S ′ for R ∈ API ∪ INTRUDER ∪
CONTROL. We want to prove that S ′ also satisfies the properties.
It is immediate to see that the properties (Sec∗), (Cert), (SymEnc), (AsymEnc), (Sign) are
invariant by application of the rules of INTRUDER and CONTROL. Indeed, these properties are about
terms deducible from S but by definition of the deducibility relation, we have {u|S `∗ u} = {u|S ′ `∗ u}
with S ⇒R S ′ and R ∈ INTRUDER. Ditto from the definition of the extended deducibility relation,
we have {u|S `∗ u} = {u|S ′ `∗ u} with S ⇒R S ′ and R ∈ CONTROL.
It only remains to see that the properties are left invariant if R ∈ API which is done by checking
each rule. In the following, we suppose that S satisfies the properties and we define S ′ as S ⇒R S ′
with R ∈ API.
The rule (Sym Gen) : Reminder of the rule (with the notations of the Section 3.2) :
i, S1, S2
N,Xk=⇒ Pe(hge(N,Null, Xk, symEncDec, i, S1, S2 ∪ {e}))
We apply Lemma 1 to S ′int = Sint∪{hge(N,Null, Xk, symEncDec, i, S1, S2∪{e})}∪NK with NK = {Xk}
if {e} ∪ S1 ∪ S2 * H and NK = ∅ on the contrary.
• invariance of (Sec∗) : let hαa (., .,m, ., i, S′1, S′2) ∈ Handle with a ∈ H, S′1, S′2 ⊆ H be such that
S ′ `∗ hαa (., .,m, ., i, S′1, S′2) then conclusion (1) of Lemma 1 tells us that either
– S `∗ hαa (., .,m, ., i, S′1, S′2),
– or hαa (., .,m, ., i, S′1, S′2) = h
g
e(N,Null, Xk, symEncDec, i, S1, S2 ∪ {e}).
In the first case, the induction hypothesis allows us to conclude. In the second case, Lemma 1
conclusion (1) with u = Xk implies that S ′ 0∗ Xk and on the other side it is clear that Xk ∈ Keyv
and e ∈ S2 ∪ {e}.
• invariance of (Cert) : from the conclusion (1) of Lemma 1, if
S ′ `∗ ha(N1, C(N1, N2, N3, Xk, pubΘ, i, S′1, S′2))
then S `∗ ha(N1, C(N1, N2, N3, Xk, pubΘ, i, S′1, S′2)) and the induction hypothesis allows us to
conclude.
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• invariance of (SymEnc) : from the conclusion (2) of Lemma 1, if S ′ `∗ {|u|}k and S ′ 0∗ k then
S `∗ {|u|}k and the induction hypothesis concludes.
• invariance of (AsymEnc) : from the conclusion (3) of Lemma 1, if S ′ `∗ {u}k and S ′ 0∗ u then
S `∗ {u}k and the induction hypothesis concludes.
• invariance of (Sign) : from conclusion (4) of Lemma 1, S ′ `∗ Σ(u, inv(k)) and S ′ 0∗ inv(k)
implies that S `∗ {|u|}k and the induction hypothesis conclude.
The rule (Sym Encrypt ) : Reminder of the rule (with the notations of the Section 3.2) :
Pb(h
α
b (N,Null, Xk, symEncDec, i, S1, S2)), Pb(m1), . . . , Pb(mn)
=⇒Pb({|m′1, . . . ,m′n|}Xk)
If S `∗ Xk, then from hypothesis (Sec∗), it means that either b /∈ H, or S1, S2 * H. In this case,
if mj is a handle of the form hαb (Nj , N
′
j , Xk,j , Tj , ij , Sj,1, Sj,2) with (ij , Sj,1, Sj,2) ≺ (i, S1, S2), it is easy
to see that S `∗ m′j since S `∗ Nj , Xk,j , N ′j . If mj is not a handle, we also have S `∗ m′j . From all
this, we deduce that S `∗ {|m′1, . . . ,m′n |}Xk and the rule does not change the set of deducible terms.
This proves the invariance of the induction hypothesis in this case.
We suppose in the following that S 0∗ Xk which allows us to apply Lemma 1 to S ′int = Sint ∪ {{|
m′1, . . . ,m′n|}Xk}.
• invariance of (Sec∗) : from Lemma 1 conclusion (1), if hαa (., .,m, ., i, S′1, S′2) ∈ Handle is such
that a ∈ H, S′1, S′2 ⊆ H and S ′ `∗ hαa (., .,m, ., i, S′1, S′2), then S `∗ hαa (., .,m, ., i, S′1, S′2) and the
induction hypothesis allows us to conclude.
• invariance of (Cert) : ditto, from Lemma 1 conclusion (1), if
S ′ `∗ ha(N1, C(N1, N2, N3, Xk, pubΘ, i, S′1, S′2))
with a ∈ H, S′1, S′2 ⊆ H then S `∗ ha(N1, C(N1, N2, N3, Xk, pubΘ, i, S′1, S′2)) and we conclude
by using the induction hypothesis.
• invariance of (SymEnc) : From Lemma 1 conclusion (2) if S ′ `∗ {|u|}k then either
– S `∗ {|u|}k and we conclude by using the induction hypothesis ;
– or we have {|u|}k = {|m′1, . . . ,m′n|}Xk , which is built following the condition of the hypothesis.
• invariance of (AsymEnc) : from the conclusion (3) of Lemma 1, if S ′ `∗ {u}k and S ′ 0∗ u then
S `∗ {u}k and the induction hypothesis concludes.
• invariance of (Sign) : from Lemma 1 conclusion (4), S ′ `∗ Σ(u, k) and S ′ 0∗ k implies that
S `∗ Σ(u, k) and the induction hypothesis allows us to conclude.
The rule (Sym Decrypt ) : Reminder of the rule (with the notations of the Section 3.2) :
Pb(h
α
b (N,Null, Xk, symEncDec, i, S1, S2)), Pb({|m1, . . . ,mn|}Xk)
=⇒Pb(m′1), . . . , Pb(m′n)
We remark that if S `∗ Xk, then the rule creates handles and under which are stored terms which
are already deducible from S.
If S 0∗ Xk, the by applying the hypothesis (SymEnc) to S `∗ {|m1, . . . ,mn|}Xk , we obtain that if
m′j is not a handle then S `∗ m′j . In all cases, the rule builds either terms which are deducible from S,
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or handles. We can thus consider that the rule only creates handles. Let hαb (., .,m, ., ic, S
′
1, S
′
2) ∈ Handle
be such a handle. In order to be able to apply Lemma 1, we want to show that if
{b} ∪ S′1 ∪ S′2 * H (15)
then S `∗ m. Indeed,
• if S `∗ Xk then S `∗ m;
• if S 0∗ Xk, then from property (SymEnc), there exists c ∈ Agent such that
S `∗ hαc (., .,m, ., ic, S′1, S′2).
we know that b ∈ H (the contrary would contradict S 0∗ Xk). Furthermore, we have S′1∪S′2 * H
since we have {b} ∪ S′1 ∪ S′2 * H and hence we deduce that S `∗ m which is what we want.
This allows us to use Lemma 1 with S ′int = Sint ∪ Hdls where Hdls are the new handles created by the
rule.
• invariance of (Sec∗) : let hαa (., .,m, ., i, S′1, S′2) ∈ Handle with a ∈ H, S′1, S′2 ⊆ H, from Lemma 1
conclusion (1), we have S ′ `∗ hαa (., .,m, ., i, S′1, S′2) with a ∈ H, S′1, S′2 ⊆ H, implies that either
– S `∗ hαa (., .,m, ., i, S′1, S′2) and we conclude by appealing to the induction hypothesis ;
– or hαa (., .,m, ., i, S′1, S′2) is m′j a handle created by applying the rule (Sym Decrypt ) on
{|m1, . . . ,mn|}Xk .
In this last case, the handle m′j is of the form h
r
b(Nj , N
′
j , Xk,j , Tj , ij , Sj,1, Sj,2). We have to show
that if b ∈ H and Sj,1, Sj,2 ⊆ H then S ′ 0∗ Xk,j . We thus suppose that b ∈ H and Sj,1, Sj,2 ⊆ H.
As (ij , Sj,1, Sj,2) ≺ (i, S1, S2), by applying the hypothesis (Sec∗), we deduce that S 0∗ Xk. Thus
we can apply hypothesis (SymEnc) to S `∗ {|m1, . . . ,mn |}Xk . We obtain the existence of a
c ∈ H such that
S `∗ hαc (N,Null, Xk, symEncDec, ic, Sc,1, Sc,2)
and furthermore the existence of a handle h.c(., ., Xk,j , ., ij , Sj,1, Sj,2) with Xk,j ∈ Keyv ∪Noncev.
We know that {c} ∪ Sj,1 ∪ Sj,2 ⊆ H and by applying (Sec∗), we obtain that S 0∗ Xk,j . Now,
from conclusion (1) of Lemma 1, we deduce that S ′ 0∗ Xk,j and Xk,j ∈ Keyv ∪ Noncev and that
b ∈ Sj,2.
For the other hypothesis, properties (Cert), (SymEnc), (AsymEnc), (Sign) for S ′ reduces, by
immediate application of respectively the conclusion (1), (2), (3) (4) of Lemma 1, to the same properties
for S.
The rule (Asym Gen) : Reminder of the rule (with the notations of Section 3.2) :
Pe(h
α
e (N1, N2, inv(Yk),privCertSign, i1, Se,1, Se,2)),
Pe(he(N2, C(N2, N1, Ncert, Yk, pubCertVerif, i1, Se,1, Se,2))), i2, S1, S2, b N3,N4,Xk=⇒
Pe(h
g
e(N3, N4, inv(Xk), privDecSign, i2, Se,1 ∪ Se,2 ∪ S1 ∪ {e}, {b, e} ∪ S2)),
Pe(Σ(C(N4, N3, N2, Xk, pubEncVerif, i2, Se,1 ∪ Se,2 ∪ S1 ∪ {e}, {b, e} ∪ S2), inv(Yk)))
Let S′e,1 = Se,1 ∪ Se,2 ∪ S1 ∪ {e} and S′e,2 = {b, e} ∪ S2 be the control sets of the handle created by
the rule. In the proof of the preservation of the invariants, we use two instances of Lemma 1, according
to whether S `∗ inv(Yk) or S 0∗ inv(Yk):
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• In case S `∗ inv(Yk), it follows from the induction hypothesis (Sec∗) that {e} ∪ Se,1 ∪ Se,2 * H,
and thus {e} ∪ S′e,1 ∪ S′e,2 * H. Then, we apply Lemma 1 to
S ′′int = Sint ∪ {hge(N3, N4, inv(Xk),privDecSign, i2, Se,1 ∪ Se,2 ∪ S1 ∪ {e}, {b, e} ∪ S2)} ∪ NK,
where NK = {N3, N4, Xk, inv(Xk)}. Indeed, it is clear that N3, N4, Xk, inv(Xk) do not appear
in S and furthermore {u|S ′ `∗ u} = {u|S ′′int `∗ u}.
• In the case that S 0∗ inv(Yk), we apply Lemma 1 to
S ′int = Sint ∪ {hge(N3, N4, inv(Xk), privDecSign, i2, Se,1 ∪ Se,2 ∪ S1 ∪ {e}, {b, e} ∪ S2)}∪
{Σ(C(N4, N3, N2, Xk,pubEncVerif, i2, Se,1 ∪ Se,2 ∪ S1 ∪ {e}, {b, e} ∪ S2), inv(Yk))} ∪ NK,
with NK = {N3, N4, Xk} if {e} ∪ S′e,1 ∪ S′e,2 ⊆ H and else NK = {N3, N4, Xk, inv(Xk)}.
• invariance of (Sec∗) : from Lemma 1 conclusion (1), we have that S ′ `∗ hαa (., .,m, ., i, S′1, S′2)
with a ∈ H, S′1, S′2 ⊆ H implies:
– either S `∗ hαa (., .,m, ., i, S′1, S′2) ;
– or hαa (., .,m, ., i, S′1, S′2) comes from the rule (Asym Gen).
In the first case, we appeal to the induction hypothesis on S. The second case can only arise
when S 0∗ inv(Yk): indeed we have then {e}∪Se,1∪Se,2 = {a}∪S′1∪S′2 ⊆ H and our induction
hypothesis (Sec∗) yields S 0∗ inv(Yk). As inv(Xk) /∈ Handle∪{N3, N4, Xk}, Lemma 1 conclusion
(1) gives S ′ 0∗ inv(Xk). Furthermore, it is clear that inv(Xk) ∈ Keyv.
• invariance of (Cert), (SymEnc) and of (AsymEnc): none of the terms concerned by these
properties are created by this rule.
• invariance of (Sign) : if S `∗ inv(Yk), thanks to Lemma 1 conclusion (4), we easily obtain that
a signature deducible from S ′ is already deducible from S. If S 0∗ inv(Yk), from Lemma 1
conclusion (4), we have S ′ `∗ Σ(t, inv(Yk)) implies either
– S `∗ Σ(t, inv(Yk)) ;
– or
Σ(t, inv(Yk)) = Σ(C(N4, N3, N2, Xk,pubEncVerif, i2, Se,1 ∪ Se,2 ∪ S1, {b, e} ∪ S2), inv(Yk)).
In the first case, the induction hypothesis allows us to conclude and in the second case, it is easily
seen that the property (Sign) is verified.
The rule (Asym SignEncrypt ) : Reminder of the rule (with the notations of Section 3.2) :
Pb(h
α
b (N1, N2, inv(Yk), privDecSign, ib, Sb,1, Sb,2),
Pb(hb(N3, C(N3, N4, N5, Xk,pubEncVerif, ic, Sc,1, Sc,2))),
Pb(m1), . . . , Pb(mn)=⇒Pb({m′1, . . . ,m′n}Xk), Pb(Σ({m′1, . . . ,m′n}Xk , inv(Yk)))
Suppose that S `∗ inv(Yk). From the hypothesis (Sec∗), it means that Sb,1 ∪ Sb,2 ∪ {b} * H.
Suppose now that for j ∈ [1..n], we have mj = hαb (Nj , N ′j , Xk,j , Tj , ij , Sj,1, Sj,2) and m′j 6= ∅. Then by
construction, we have
(ij , Sj,1, Sj,2) ≺ (ib, Sb,1, Sb,2). (16)
Thus, from the definition of `∗ and because of (16), we have S `∗ Nj , Xk,j , N ′j and thus S `∗ m′j .
Since furthermore, S `∗ m′j if mj is not a handle, we deduce that S `∗ {m′1, . . . ,m′n}Xk . We have
moreover S `∗ Σ({m′1, . . . ,m′n}Xk , inv(Yk)). In this case the execution of the rule does not change the
set of deducible terms.
From now on, we suppose that S 0∗ inv(Yk). We have two cases:
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• If Sc,1 ∪ Sc,2 ⊆ H, by applying the hypothesis (Cert), there exists a c ∈ Sc,2 and a handle such
that:
S `∗ hαc (N4, N3, inv(Xk), privDecSign, ic, Sc,1, Sc,2).
By applying (Sec∗), we find that S 0∗ inv(Xk). As moreover S 0∗ inv(Yk), we can use Lemma
1 with S ′int = Sint ∪ {{m′1, . . . ,m′n}Xk} ∪ {Σ({m′1, . . . ,m′n}Xk , inv(Yk))}.
• If Sc,1 ∪ Sc,2 * H, as by construction we have
(ij , Sj,1, Sj,2) ≺ (ic, Sc,1, Sc,2), (17)
we deduce as before that S `∗ Nj , Xk,j , N ′j and thus S `∗ m′j if mj is a handle. As moreover,
S `∗ m′j if mj is not a handle, we deduce that S `∗ {m′1, . . . ,m′n}Xk . We can then use Lemma
1 with S ′int = Sint ∪ {Σ({m′1, . . . ,m′n}Xk , inv(Yk))}.
• invariance of (Sec∗) : from Lemma 1 conclusion (1), if there exists a handle hαa (., .,m, ., i, S′1, S′2)
such that
S ′ `∗ hαa (., .,m, ., i, S′1, S′2)
then S `∗ hαa (., .,m, ., i, S′1, S′2) and the induction hypothesis allows us to conclude.
• invariance of (Cert) : ditto, Lemma 1 conclusion (1) allows us to reduce directly to the induction
hypothesis.
• invariance of (SymEnc) : Lemma 1 conclusion (2) allows us to reduce to the induction hypoth-
esis.
• invariance of (AsymEnc) : Let u, k ∈ Msg be such that S ′ `∗ {u}k and S ′ 0∗ u then Lemma 1
conclusion (3) tells us that either
– S `∗ {u}k,
– or {u}k = {m′1, . . . ,m′n}Xk .
In the first case we are reduced to the induction hypothesis, and in the second case (AsymEnc)
is easily verified.
• invariance of (Sign) : by applying Lemma 1 conclusion (4), we obtain that if Σ(u, k) is a term such
that S ′ `∗ Σ(u, k) then either S `∗ Σ(u, k) and the induction hypothesis allows us to conclude
or Σ(u, k) is generated by the rule and it is an immediate verification that the hypothesis (Sign)
is fulfilled in this case.
The rule (Asym VerifDecrypt ) : Reminder of the rule (with the notations of the Section 3.2) :
Pb(hb(N1, C(N1, N2, N3, Yk,pubEncVerif, ic, Sc,1, Sc,2))),
Pb(h
α
b (N4, N5, inv(Xk), privDecSign, ib, Sb,1, Sb,2)),
Pb({m1, . . . ,mn}Xk), Pb(Σ({m1, . . . ,mn}Xk , inv(Yk)))
=⇒Pb(m′1), . . . , Pb(m′n)
First, we remark that the terms created by the rule which are not handles are deducible from S.
In fact, we have either:
• S `∗ m1, . . . ,mn and in this case it is clear that if m′j is not a handle then S `∗ m′j ;
• or S 0∗ m1, . . . ,mn and in this case, by applying (AsymEnc), we obtain that if m′j is not a
handle, there exists m ∈ Msg such that S `∗ m and m′j = m.
RR n° 8274
A Secure Key Management Interface with Asymmetric Crypto 26
We have established that the execution of the rule only produces terms which are deducible from S
and handles. Let hαb (., .,m, ., i, S
′
1, S
′
2) be such a handle. To allow us to apply Lemma 1, we are going
to prove that if {b} ∪ S′1 ∪ S′2 * H then S `∗ m. Indeed, we have either
• S `∗ m1, . . . ,mn and it case it is clear that S `∗ m;
• or S 0∗ m1, . . . ,mn which implies that S 0∗ inv(Xk) from which we deduce that b ∈ H.
Then using (AsymEnc), there exists c ∈ Agent and a handle hαc (., .,m, ., i, S′1, S′2) such that
S `∗ hαc (., .,m, ., i, S′1, S′2). As b ∈ H and {b}∪S′1 ∪S′2 * H, we deduce that S′1 ∪S′2 * H so that
S `∗ m.
At this point, we have proven that the execution of the rule only produce terms which are deducible
from S and handles, and that if the value of these handles is deducible from S ′ then it was already
deducible from S. Let Hdls be the set of handles created by the rule, we can thus apply Lemma 1 with
S ′int = Sint ∪ Hdls.
• invariance of (Sec∗) : let hαa (., .,m, ., i, S′1, S′2) be a handle with a ∈ H, S′1, S′2 ⊆ H, from Lemma
1 conclusion (1), we have that S ′ `∗ hαa (., .,m, ., i, S′1, S′2), implies:
– either S `∗ hαa (., .,m, ., i, S′1, S′2) and the induction hypothesis allows us to conclude;
– or hαa (., .,m, ., i, S′1, S′2) is a handle created by application of the rule (Asym VerifDecrypt
).
In this latter case, we have
hαa (., .,m, ., i, S
′
1, S
′
2) = h
r
b(Nj , N
′
j , Xk,j , Tj , ij , Sj,1, Sj,2),
with
(ij , Sj,2, Sj,2) ≺ (ib, Sb,1, Sb,2) and (ij , Sj,2, Sj,2) ≺ (ic, Sc,1, Sc,2). (18)
We have to prove that if b ∈ H and Sj,1, Sj,2 ⊆ H then S ′ 0∗ Xk,j , Xk,j ∈ Key ∪ Nonce and
b ∈ Sj,2. Since
S `∗ hb(N1, C(N1, N2, N3, Yk, pubEncVerif, ic, Sc,1, Sc,2)),
from the hypothesis (Cert) and (18), we know that ∃c ∈ Sc,2 such as
S `∗ h.c(N2, N1, inv(Yk),privDecSign, ic, Sc,1, Sc,2).
From (18), we have c ∈ H and Sc,1, Sc,2 ⊆ H so that by application of (Sec∗), we obtain that
S 0∗ inv(Yk). (19)
Now, thanks to (Sign) and (19), we obtain the existence of a handle
S `∗ h.d(Nj , N ′j , Xk,j , Tj , ij , Sj,1, Sj,2),
with Xk,j ∈ Keyv ∪ Noncev. As d ∈ H, Sj,1, Sj,2 ⊆ H, by applying (Sec∗), we obtain that
S 0∗ Xk,j , Xk,j ∈ Key∪Nonce and b ∈ Sj,2. From S 0∗ Xk,j and Lemma 1 conclusion (1) applied
to u = Xk,j , we deduce S ′ 0∗ Xk,j .
Preservation of invariants (SymEnc), (AsymEnc), (Sign) and (Cert) follow from the induction
hypothesis and Lemma 1 applied to S ′ = S ∪ Hdls.
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The rule (Cert Gen) : Reminder of the rule (with the notations of the Section 3.2) :
Pe(h
α
e (N1, N2, inv(Yk),privCertSign, ie, Se,1, Se,2)),
Pe(he(N2, C(N2, N1, Ncert, Yk, pubCertVerif, ie, Se,1, Se,2))), ib, S1, S2 N3,N4,Xk=⇒
Pe(h
g
e(N3, N4, inv(Xk), privCertSign, ib, Se,1 ∪ Se,2 ∪ S1 ∪ {e}, {e, b} ∪ S2)),
Pe(Σ(C(N4, N3, N2, Xk, pubCertVerif, ib, Se,1 ∪ Se,2 ∪ S1 ∪ {e}, {e, b} ∪ S2), inv(Yk)))
The proof for this rule is exactly the same as that of (Asym Gen).
The rule (Cert Verif) : Reminder of the rule (with the notations of the Section 3.2) :
Pb(Σ(C(N1, N2, N3, Xk, pubΘ, ic, Sc,1, Sc,2), inv(Yk))),
Pb(hb(N3, C(N3, N4, N5, Yk,pubCertVerif, ie, Se,1, Se,2)))=⇒
Pb(hb(N1, C(N1, N2, N3, Xk, pubΘ, ic, Sc,1, Sc,2)))
The rule creates a handle the value of which is clearly deducible from S (by applying a signa-
ture deduction rule to the signed term). We can thus apply Lemma 1, by setting S ′int = Sint ∪
{hb(N1, C(N1, N2, N3, Xk, pubΘ, ic, Sc,1, Sc,2))}.
• invariance of (Sec∗) : it reduces immediately to the induction hypothesis thanks to Lemma 1
conclusion (1).
• invariance of (Cert) : because of Lemma 1 conclusion (1) and the induction hypothesis, we need
only prove (Cert) for an integrity handle produced by the execution of the rule. In other words,
we must prove that if b ∈ H, Sc,1 ∪ Sc,2 ⊆ H then there exists c ∈ Sc,2 such that :
S ′ `∗ h.c(N2, N1, inv(Xk), privΘ, ic, Sc,1, Sc,2). (20)
As we consider a handle created by the rule, we have
(ic, Sc,1,∅) ≺ (ie, Se,1 ∪ Se,2,∅), (21)
Thus, Se,1 ∪ Se,2 ⊆ H. By applying the hypothesis (Cert) to
S `∗ hb(N3, C(N3, N4, N5, Yk, Se,1, pubCertVerif, ie, Se,2)),
we deduce the existence of e ∈ Se,2 such that
S `∗ h.e(N4, N3, inv(Yk),privCertSign, ie, Se,1, Se,2).
Because of (21), we have e ∈ H and Se,1 ∪ Se,2 ⊆ H, so that from (Sec∗), S 0∗ inv(Yk). By
applying (Sign) to
S `∗ Σ(C(N1, N2, N3, Xk, pubΘ, ic, Sc,1, Sc,2), inv(Yk)),
we deduce (20) with c ∈ Sc,2.
• invariance of (SymEnc) : it directly follows from Lemma 1 conclusion (2).
• invariance of (AsymEnc) : it directly follows from Lemma 1 conclusion (3).
• invariance of (Sign) : it directly follows from Lemma 1 conclusion (4).

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6 Experiments
We have used our API to implement some asymmetric key protocols based on well-known examples
from the Clark-Jacob corpus. Since we impose a secure encryption and signature scheme, our versions
of protocols are secure even when the original is not. For example, our implementation of Needham-
Schroeder public key avoids Lowe’s attack because all messages are signed. Full details together
with a Prolog script for generating API commands from protocols are available at http://www.lsv.
ens-cachan.fr/~steel/genericapi/asym.
7 Conclusions
We have given the design for a key management API for cryptographic devices that allows the use
of asymmetric keys for managing keys, together with security properties and proofs in the Dolev Yao
model. This is first such design with security proofs as far as we are aware. A variant of this API will
be soon implemented for use in French ministry of defence systems. In future work we will add more
flexibility to the API. In particular it should be easy to adapt the design to other security orderings
not necessarily based on agent identifiers.
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